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Why are some lobby groups less benign in their external effects than others? Nearly three decades 
ago, Mancur Olson (1982) proposed that less-encompassing lobby groups with their constituents 
collectively representing a narrow range of sectors are more apt to seek the types of subsidies, ta-
riffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that impose costs on the rest of society. To 
the best of our knowledge, Olson‟s oft-cited hypothesis has yet to be actually tested, due perhaps to 
the absence of adequate data on general policy preferences of various types of lobbies. Thus, we 
examine a pair of surveys from 2003 and 2004 which were targeted at managers of business associ-
ations (lobby groups) and their enterprise constituents to directly test Olson‟s hypothesis. Managers 
from a diverse array of Russian industrial firms and business associations were asked similar ques-
tions regarding their attitudes to policies that explicitly benefit well-defined sectoral or regional in-
terests and, implicitly, impose external costs. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of less-
encompassing associations and the constituent firms of such groups are much more apt to see such 
policies in a favorable light.  In contrast, more-encompassing associations and their member display 
greater skepticism toward narrowly targeted government interventions. Our results strongly support 
Olson‟s hypothesis.   
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Tässä  tutkimuksessa  tarkastellaan,  miksi  joidenkin  yhteiskunnallisten  painostusryhmien(vai: 
eturyhmien?) toimet ovat vähemmän haitallisia näiden ryhmien ulkopuolisille(?) kuin toisten. Liki 
kolmekymmentä vuotta sitten Mancur Olson (1982) esitti, että kapea-alaiset (less-encompassing) 
painostusryhmät(eturyhmät?), jotka edustavat vain muutamia yhteiskunnan toimijoita, tavoittelevat 
usein  tukia,  tariffeja,  verohelpotuksia  tai  muita  kilpailua  rajoittavia  toimia,  joiden  negatiiviset 
ulkoisvaikutukset jäävät muiden maksettaviksi. Kahden haastattelututkimuksen aineiston pohjalta 
tässä tutkimuksessa testataan ensimmäisen kerran empiirisesti Olsonin kuuluisa hypoteesi. Aineisto 
on kerätty vuosina 2003 ja 2004 haastattelemalla sekä yritysten etujärjestöjen että jäsenjärjestöjen ja 
ei-jäsenten johtajia Venäjällä. Analyysin tulokset tukevat vahvasti Olsonin hypoteesia.  
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1  Introduction  
 
In pursuit of constituent interests, some business lobbies seek to impose costs on non-members. 
Other lobby services, in contrast, may push agendas that are benign or even beneficial to outsiders. 
Strikingly, most economics literature on business lobbies fails to acknowledge this diversity, and 
the few studies that do recognize the varying impacts of lobbies offer little guidance as to the ori-
gins of this disparity or where one might expect to find a given group on a spectrum of potential 
effects.  
The exception is Mancur Olson‟s work on interest groups, which offers a testable hypothe-
sis as to why some lobby groups are less benign in their external effects than others. In his 1982 
book The Rise and Decline of Nations, Olson distinguishes interest groups in light of the degree to 
which  their  constituents  collectively  represent  a  broad  cross-section  of  a  community.  Less-
encompassing interest groups, he postulates, are more apt to seek the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax 
loopholes and competition-limiting regulations that impose costs on the rest of society. This notion, 
fundamental to his analysis of collective action and comparative development, has, to the best of 
our knowledge, never been directly tested.
1 Is it truly the case that narrowly oriented groups have a 
greater interest in lobbying for the sorts of policy interventions that redistribute, rather than expand, 
the economic pie? Are less-encompassing lobbies more inclined to engage in unproductive rent-
seeking? Given the broad implications of the answers to these questions, we believe they deserve 
investigation. 
Economics literature is rich with discussion of how socially sub-optimal institutions might 
be sustained through the interaction of self-interested lobbies and public officials (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994), yet the topic what might affect a lobby‟s intensity of preference for potentially dis-
tortive government interventions has barely been explored. We suspect this is due in part to the ab-
sence of adequate data for measuring the diversity of business interests with respect to government 
intervention. One of us (Pyle) was involved in a pair of surveys conducted in 2003 and 2004 tar-
                                                 
1 Much of Olson‟s work on collective action (1965, 1982, 1996, 2000) address why some groups are more apt to be 
successful in representing the collective interests of their lobbies. He argues, for instance, that smaller, more homogen-
ous and geographically concentrated lobbies are more likely to avoid “free rider” problems and other problems that 
might frustrate collective action. The factors explaining interest group success, however, are not central to our analysis 
here. 
 William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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geted at business lobby groups and their constituents in Russia. Revisiting this work, we realized 
these surveys provided nearly ideal material for testing Olson‟s hypothesis. 
In the surveys, managers from a diverse array of Russian industrial firms and business lob-
bies were asked similar questions regarding their attitudes to policies that explicitly benefit well-
defined sectoral or regional interests and, implicitly, impose external costs. The pattern of responses 
is striking. Managers of less-encompassing lobbies and their constituent firms are much more in-
clined to view such policies in a favorable light. More-encompassing lobby groups and their mem-
bers, in contrast, are more skeptical of narrowly-targeted government interventions. Our analysis of 
the survey data thus clearly support Olson‟s hypothesis. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature, and Section 3 
provides a brief summary of the development of business lobbies in the post-communist era. The 
unique Russian survey data we draw on for the empirical analysis is presented in Section 4, along 
with data that illustrate the general importance of business lobby groups to the business-state inter-
face and to specific types of firms. Section 5, the heart of the paper, starts by presenting the ques-
tions we use to assess the intensity of a firm‟s commitment to free markets. We then explore the 
degree to which the responses of member firms and associations relate to associations of different 
types. Section 6 considers the relative importance of different services offered by associations. Sec-
tion 7 presents conclusions. 
 
 
2   Lobby groups and the economics literature 
 
Olson observes that business lobbies, and other special interest groups, have an interest in increas-
ing the welfare of their constituents, irrespective of their effects on the well-being of others. As a 
matter of principle, they tend to favor to measures that impose a greater burden on society than the 
benefit they confer on group members. They lobby for new economic institutions (e.g. taxes, subsi-
dies, tariffs and regulatory barriers that decrease competition) whose “effects may be different un-
der certain initial conditions (because of „second-best‟ problems), [but] in general … will … in-
crease the income of those favored by the legislation but also reduce efficiency … (Olson, 1982, 
45).” Olson then goes on to acknowledge that, in certain circumstances, lobby groups may engage 
in activities that increase (or at least do not diminish) social welfare: 
[In] organizations that encompass a substantial portion of the societies of which they 
are a part … the incentives … are dramatically different from those facing an organi- 
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zation that represents only a narrow segment of society … [T]he encompassing organ-
ization, if it has rational leadership, will care about the excess burden arising from 
distributional  policies  favorable  to  its  members  and  will  out  of  sheer  self-interest 
strive  to  make  the  excess  burden  as  small  as  possible.  …”  (Olson,  1982,  p.  48)  
 
Olson argues interests of collective action groups reflect their composition. Groups with member-
ships more representative of broader society have collective interests that differ from groups with 
more narrowly drawn memberships. The implication here is that general preferences for policies 
that create barriers to trade or prioritize certain sectors over others should be greater within organi-
zations that represent a smaller share of the economic landscape. Narrower (i.e. less-encompassing) 
interests should, therefore, express greater enthusiasm for government intervention. 
Olson pays less attention to how heterogeneity of interests across groups might extend to, 
or even reflect, the interests of the individual actors that comprise the groups. His argument, how-
ever, can reasonably be extended to suggest that, all else equal, individual actors (here, firms and 
the individuals that represent them) tend to join organizations that share their interests. If this is 
true, we would expect to observe that differences of opinions (with respect to, say, the general de-
sirability  of  government  intervention  in  the  market)  across  the  leaderships  of  more-  and  less-
encompassing groups mirrored in the leaderships of member firms. 
The theoretical literature generally maintains Olson‟s skepticism about the purposes and 
effects of lobby group activities. The seminal work of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996, and 
2001)  formally  demonstrates  that  welfare-reducing  government  interventions  may  constitute  an 
equilibrium outcome in a world where business interests bid for self-benefitting protection and sup-
port from self-interested public officials. Several authors follow their lead by modeling lobbying as 
a “menu auction” in which lobby groups offer decision-makers a list of campaign contribution 
“trades” for policies.
2 All such models assume an exogenously given, finite number of special inter-
est groups with differing policy preferences (preferred policies are extreme and only benefit group 
members). 
Business lobbies, like other special interest groups, tend to be portrayed in these political 
economy models as a socially harmful, yet inevitable, element of modern democracy. They do not 
address, however, the issue of the different welfare consequences of the menus offering of various 
interest groups – i.e. why some groups, in representing their constituents, seek policies that have 
                                                 
2 See Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Person and Tabellini (2000) and the references therein for a survey. Felli and 
Merlo (2006) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) extend menu-auction models to include endogenous lobbying 
decisions. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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more malign effects for the rest of society than others. The theoretical literature generally glosses 
over this aspect of lobby group action. While all acknowledge that lobbies are not identical, they are 
assumed to differ in their policy preferences, not in the way they might promote their cause or the 
consequences of their efforts. In other words, once organized, interest groups are considered to be-
have identically. 
Taking Olson‟s argument, however, it appears the type of interest group should be a sub-
stantial concern when assessing its impact on social welfare; a more-encompassing group may be-
have differently from one that is less encompassing. Guriev et al. (2009) is the sole article were able 
to identify that carefully considers why different lobby groups impose different external costs. Like 
us, Guriev et al. draw on regional and firm-level data from contemporary Russia. Their paper spe-
cifically remarks that the high degree of regional autonomy in the Russian Federation makes its po-
litical economy an ideal testing ground for this type of a question. Unlike us, the authors do not 
consider Olson-like groups of firms bound by membership in voluntarily comprised, not-for-profit 
associations, but instead focus on groups of firms joined by overlapping ownership in conglomer-
ate-like, profit-motivated structures. Some of these large business groups, they highlight, draw in 
firms from across multiple regions, while others are concentrated in a single region. They demon-
strate that Firms in regions bordered by influential multi-regional business groups tend to perform 
better than firms in regions bordered by influential mono-regional groups. The implication, they 
argue, is that multi-regional groups are more likely to consider the external effects of the regional 
institutions they are able to influence. Policy in regions dominated by multi-regional  groups is 
likely to be less harmful to actors in neighboring regions than in regions dominated by geographi-
cally concentrated groups. They infer the nature of those policies from firm-level performance in 
adjoining regions, while we observe the nature of lobby-group interests more directly. 
This article hopes to contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the im-
portance of interest group type, measured by what Olson christened encompassingness in shaping 
group preferences over government intervention. Before proceeding, we return to Olson for guid-
ance on assessing this particular characteristic of a collective. While his guidance on what consti-
tutes an encompassing interest is somewhat sketchy, he does specify that business organizations 
representing multiple industries tend be more broadly concerned with social welfare than those that 
represent a single industry. He further notes that more-encompassing organizations typically have 
stronger incentives to develop contacts with other organized interest groups.
 3 Inter-group consulta-
                                                 
3 “The circumstance in which an increase in the extent to which a special-interest organization is encompassing is like-
ly to be most constructive is when it is already so substantial that it encompasses many different industries. At that  
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tion, he argues, best serves the interests of an organization with less parochial views and expands a 




3   Russia’s lobbies 
 
Many of Russia‟s earliest associations grew out of small private initiatives permitted during the late 
Soviet period.
5 Others dating back to this era were organized by large state enterprises that shared 
an interest in preserving inter-firm ties and access to state subsidies as the mechanisms of central-
ized economic coordination evaporated, established from the top down by ministry officials as their 
own hedge against the uncertainty of the future (Lehmbruch, 1999), or, in some cases, served as 
fronts for corrupt or profit-motivated ventures. As a rule, these early associations were neither well 
organized nor transparent in purpose (Sulakshin and Romanikhin, 2003). Unlike some countries in 
continental Europe, business association membership in Russia has always been voluntary. 
The reforms of the 1990s gave rise to a wave of national-level, sector-specific organiza-
tions, as well as a number of multi-sector and sector-specific organizations operating at the regional 
and municipal levels. Although the lack of a comprehensive registry continues to make accurate 
accounting of their numbers impossible, a recent estimate puts the number of business associations 
nationally at close to 5,000.
6 The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) and the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TPP) are two multi-sector associations that are among the 
most developed and influential. RUIE first developed as a powerful alliance of Soviet-era enterprise 
directors that in the initial stages of the reform era lobbied for the retention of many price controls, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
stage further expansion may not affect the market or industrial action of the organization, but it would create an incen-
tive to give greater weight to the organization‟s impact on social efficiency … In the same way national confederations 
of business or labor organizations can also introduce a more nearly national perspective on political issues without af-
fecting the degree of monopoly. These organizations, which political scientists sometimes call peak associations, fre-
quently lack the unity needed to have any great influence on public policy, or even coherent and specific policies. Non-
etheless, peak associations should on average take a somewhat less parochial view than the narrow associations of 
which they are composed …” (Olson, 1982, p. 48) 
4 “The encompassing organization] has not only an incentive at least to consider the effect of its policies on the effi-
ciency of the society, but also an incentive to bargain with other substantial organized groups in the interest of a more 
productive society. The really narrow special-interest group usually does not have an incentive to do even that …” (p. 
48) 
5 Much of this section draws closely on similar narratives in Pyle (2006 and 2010). 
6 Author‟s interview in July 2005 in Moscow with the Director of the Department for Cooperation with Business Asso-
ciations at the Chamber of Commerce of the Russian Federation. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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continued access to state subsidies and strict limits on foreign investment (McFaul, 1993; Hanson 
and Teague, 2005). By the late-1990s, it had begun to adopt a more liberal orientation and help or-
ganize a network of independent affiliates. Like these RSPP affiliates, the Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (CCI) drew their membership from many sectors of the economy. Regulated through a 
special 1993 law guaranteeing their independence from state bodies, the TPP network traces its 
roots to a communist-era institution that promoted commercial ties with the non-communist bloc. 
Like the RSPP, relatively little has been written of its activities, particularly those of the 170-plus 
independent Chambers that operate at the regional and municipal levels.
7 
The functions of business associations can be charted along two dimensions. First, they 
help develop and strengthen “horizontal” ties among non-state actors, for instance, by facilitating 
inter-firm communication regarding, for instance, new technologies (Pyle, 2006) and the reliability 
of potential trade partners (Pyle, 2005).  Second, they can be instrumental in the “vertical” relation-
ship between the business community and state actors, aggregating and transmitting business inter-
ests to public officials. At the federal level, for instance, RSPP was widely recognized as being a 
powerful force behind some of the reform efforts pushed forward (not always successfully) in the 
early Putin years – e.g., judicial and natural monopoly reform, accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization, and the dismantling of regulatory barriers to small business development. Assessing the 
RSPP‟s record from this time, one pair of experts concluded that “In many cases, the RSPP lobby-




4  Data 
 
4.1  Surveys of firms and associations 
 
Our data derive from two separate surveys of industrial enterprises conducted across the Russian 
Federation to develop a picture of what associations do and why firms join them. In the initial 
screening survey of 1,353 industrial firms in 48 territorial subjects in 2003,  respondents were asked 
to identify their firm‟s ownership type, number of employees, and whether the firm was a member 
of a business association(s). If the firm was an association member, the respondent was further 
                                                 
7 For additional and valuable perspectives on lobbying and business associations in Russia, see Frye (2002), Golikova 
(2007, 2009), and Zudin (2006).  
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asked to provide the name(s) of the association(s) to which it belonged. By construction, slightly 
less than half of the respondents employed between 10 and 100 workers.
8 The mean and median 
sizes of the respondents were 485 and 130 employees, respectively; 6.8%, were municipal or state 
enterprises. Slightly over a third, 34.2%, of the respondents reported being a member of at least one 
business association, while 6.7% reported being in at least two; only 1.2% reported being in three or 
more associations.  With respect to specific associations, membership rates in regional TPPs and 
RSSP affiliates were the highest. By industrial sector, membership rates ranged from a low of 
27.0% in metallurgy to a high of 44.6% in light industry. In each of the sectors, membership rates 
increase with the size of the firms such that, overall, the membership rate for firms with over 500 
employees (57.6%) substantially exceeded that of firms of under 100 (21.4%). 
This screening survey, in turn, was used to construct a sample for a much more detailed 
survey of 606 firms representing over half of Russia‟s territorial subjects.
9 An effort was made to 
achieve roughly equal distribution of respondents across territorial subjects and seven industrial sec-
tors.
10 By construction, 280 (or slightly under a half) were members of associations; 88 of these re-
ported being members of at least two. In addition to standard firm-specific information, the survey 
carried out in the spring of 2004 asked enterprise managers a series of questions about their interac-
tion with business associations. Some of these association-specific questions were directed at all 
firms, whereas some were only designed to be answered by members. This latter group of questions 
asked for specific responses about each of the two associations described as most important to the 
enterprise‟s well-being. 
From these questions, we calculate the share of firms belonging to the different types of as-
sociations. For instance, firms were more likely to be members of regional associations (one whose 
membership is derived almost exclusively from a single territorial subject) than federal or multi-
regional associations. Whereas only 46.2% of firms from the full sample were members in any type 
                                                 
8 For those with more than one hundred employees, we surveyed equal numbers across the seven industrial sectors. 
Within each sector, we sought the distribution with respect to employment represented in the national firm registry sup-
plied by the government statistical agency Goskomstat. As an example, the same number of firms was surveyed in the 
chemical and metallurgical industries, but the latter group included a relatively higher proportion of enterprises with 
over 500 employees. Using local business registries, firms were then selected at random to fulfill the regional, sector, 
and size quotas. 
9 Russia is constitutionally a federation made up of subjects or regions (89 in 2003 and 83 presently). These regions 
vary a great deal in terms of economic institutions, income levels, and growth rates. Hanson and Bradshaw (2000) pro-
vide an excellent overview of regional disparities. Solanko (2008) offers recent data on growth across Russian regions.  
10 The screening survey‟s findings of membership rate variation across sectors and employment sizes were used to 
weight the sample‟s distribution of members and non-members across these two dimensions. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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of association, 39.4% (239 of 606) of the firms reported belonging to a regional association. Re-
gion-level associations thus had much higher membership rates than supra-regional or federal or-
ganizations. 
Of firms that reported membership in at least one regional association, 85.8% (205) were 
in associations that draw membership from across multiple sectors, whereas 20.1% (48) belonged to 
at least one regional sector-specific association. A small number, 5.9% (14) of firms are in both 
types of regional associations. We use this distinction between multi-sector and sector-specific as-
sociations below as our proxy for encompassingness. 
A second detailed survey, also administered in the spring of 2004, queried the directors of 
145 independent regional business associations, representing 34 of Russia‟s eighty-plus territorial 
subjects.
11 The solid majority of these organizations, 85.5% (124), represent multiple sectors. The 
remaining sector-specific associations represent a variety of industrial interests, with those in wood-
processing and paper, light industry, and food processing being the most common in the sample. 
 
4.2  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary datafrom the firm survey. The first column presents descriptive statistics 
on sampled firms that are not members of regional lobby groups; columns two and three record 
summary  measures  for  the  members,  respectively,  of  multi-sector  and  sector-specific  organiza-
tions.
12  With a few exceptions, the apparent differences between members and non-members are 
modest. The members of regional associations, however, tend to be larger than non-members, a 
regularity found elsewhere in the world and consistent with larger firms having a greater capacity to 
pay membership dues and influence the strategic direction of associations. Members of associations 
also appear more apt to engage in transactions outside the borders of their region, an not entirely 
surprising finding given that associations provide services that help firms initiate and sustain cus-
tomer and supplier relationships (e.g. hosting trade fairs and helping to resolve disputes). These dif-
                                                 
11 In the absence of an official registry, a variety of sources were used to construct a sample of active associations that 
we deemed to be broadly representative in terms of regional distribution and the mix between sector-specific and multi-
sector associations. The questionnaire was also answered by 55 multi-regional or federal associations; we do not con-
sider their responses for the purposes of this article because the questions that constitute the focus of our analysis of 
lobby group interests are most relevant to policy at the regional level. Moreover, we are interested here in the relation-
ship between region-level political and economic variables and the attitudes expressed by the management of regional 
lobby groups and their constituents.  
12 A rough sense of how flows into regional associations have changed across time can be gleaned from the years in 
which our surveyed firms reported joining associations. A small minority reports joining regional associations during 
the Soviet era. Entry was steady from 1992 until the 1998 financial crisis. The biggest spike in membership occurred 
between 1999 and 2001.  
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ferences generally hold up whether we compare non-members with members of either multi-sector 
or sector-specific associations. Limiting comparisons to within the group of firms that belong to at 
least one regional association, those in multi-sector associations are more likely to have foreign 




Table 2 presents summary statistics on the survey on regional business associations. At the time of 
the survey, the regional associations averaged just over eight years in age and operated with roughly 
17 paid  employees.
14  Just under two-thirds were  located in  the capital  city of their region  and 
slightly  over  half  counted  individual  entrepreneurs/businesspeople  among  their  founders.  Other 
business associations and state organizations/agencies routinely played prominent roles in establish-
ing regional associations. Table 2 shows that, relative to sector-specific lobbies, associations repre-
senting multiple sectors were older and larger. In addition to having members from various indus-
trial branches, many also included firms from the transportation, communications, trade, finance, 
healthcare, and education sectors.   
 
[Table 2] 
4.3  Evidence of the role of associations in representing firm interests 
 
As far as firms are concerned, business lobbies (and their preferences) only meaningfully affect pol-
icy if they represent their interests and, of course, if the lobbies share this understanding of their 
role. To assess the extent to which Russia‟s regional associations are relevant in this regard, asso-
ciation managers were asked to characterize on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (extremely 
important) the importance of various services to the life of their association. Their ranking appears 
in Table 3. At the top of the list, “lobbying government officials” scored an average of 4.5, followed 
by “participating in the development of legislation” and “participating in the development of indus-
trial policy,” respectively. The managers at regional associations ranked the three services most 
                                                 
13 Provided that firms paid their required dues, the survey evidence suggests that there are few, if any, barriers to joining 
and retaining membership. For instance, we found little evidence that associations were exclusive clubs. Only one of 
326 non-members in our survey reported having been denied admission to a business association. Among current mem-
bers, only a sixth reported knowing of an instance where their association had expelled a member. Most cases were the 
result of non-payment of dues, while a smaller number stemmed from reported violations of established behavioral 
norms. 
14 On average, these associations drew on the services of just over six volunteers. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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closely associated with the representation of members‟ policy interests ahead of every other service 




Firms were also asked whether they tried to influence the contents of new laws and regulations and, 
if so, to which parties they appealed. Most of the firms, 64.0%, reported not trying to exercise this 
sort of influence. But of those that confessed to being pro-active in this regard, a non-trivial per-
centage reported using business associations. As shown in Table 4, 10.9% of all surveyed firms said 
they seek out business associations‟ assistance, a percentage that exceeds those using other non-
public-sector channels, such as the media, influential individuals or the collaboration of trade un-
ions. Directly accessing government personnel, not surprisingly, was the most popular channel for 
exercising influence over design of new policies, with 20.1% of all firms reporting that they had 




Among the subset of respondents belonging to regional business lobbies, the percentage of those 
responding that they use business associations is comparable to those that directly approach offi-
cials in the legislative branch, 20.9% as opposed 24.3%. Among all firms admitting to attempts at 
exerting influence, 30.3% reported using business lobbies. Within the subset of that group that be-
longs to a business association, just under 40% reported drawing directly on the services of a busi-
ness association.  
Before analyzing how encompassingness relates to the interests of lobby groups, we ex-
plore first for whom their representation services are most important. Specifically, we investigate 
the enterprise and region-level characteristics related to seeking out the assistance of business asso-
ciations when trying to influence the design of new laws rules and regulations by estimating the fol-
lowing equations with probit models:  
 
                                                 
15 Member firms were asked to provide a similar assessment of regional association‟s services. They ranked the provi-
sion of informational, legal and consulting services as well as assistance in developing contacts with other Russian 
firms ahead of the business representation services. This difference should not be all that surprising when we consider 
that firms may not be fully aware of the business representation services provided on their behalf. Services provided 
directly to them (e.g. consulting and being introduced to a new trade partner at an association-sponsored trade fair) are 
typically those with which they are most familiar.   
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Li  = α + βEi + γFi + δCi + ζRi + εi ,  (1a) 
Li  = α + βEi + γFi + δCi + ζRi + λECi + εi ,  (1b) 
 Li  = α + βEi + γFi + δCi + ζRi + φBi +  ε ,  (1c) 
where Lm  is a dichotomous variable that, if the firm reports having used the services of business 
lobbies, takes on the value of one (and zero otherwise). 
Em, a measure of the firm‟s workforce size, may positively affect the decision to use their 
services because larger size may confer greater ability to exercise influence within an association. 
Alternatively, size may open up other, non-intermediated channels through which to exercise influ-
ence. Larger firms, for instance, may derive relatively more power over state officials through their 
enhanced ability to trade votes or other assets for influence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
16 
Fm is a vector of additional characteristics specific to the firm that one might reasonably 
presume affect demand for lobby group services. Controls for ownership by the state and by for-
eigners are included, as is one for whether the firm was created in the post-Soviet era. Controls are 
included for a firm‟s exposure to trade beyond its regional borders. Specifically, dummies capture 
whether the firm purchases inputs from and sells output to foreign countries and other Russian re-
gions. Other dummies measure whether the respondent has trade partners that include government 
entities or firms within a commercially-oriented business group (i.e. within a single, overlapping 
ownership structure). Indices measuring the relative sophistication of the firm‟s capital stock and 
the competitiveness of the firm‟s primary output market are also included, as is a dummy variable 
reflecting whether the firm‟s major competitors are based outside its region. Three location dum-
mies are included to capture whether the respondent is based in a regional capital or in Moscow or 
St. Petersburg, the two cities with the same status as a region. Finally, we include enterprise sector 
controls. 
We suspect that regional characteristics may affect the demand for lobby group services. 
Russia is constitutionally a federation consisting of 83 territorial subjects (regions) that have en-
joyed a considerable degree of autonomy in deciding economic policy (Berkowitz and DeJong, 
2003). Although the trend in recent years has been toward re-centralizing policy-making, economic 
institutions and income levels still vary widely across Russia‟s regions. Despite evidence of conver-
                                                 
16 Prior research shows that larger firms are more likely to join associations, possibly because of their greater ability to 
absorb the costs of membership and a greater ability to affect the strategic direction of the association (Pyle, 2006). William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
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gence in income levels, regional disparities remain extremely large (Solanko, 2008),
17 and a number 
of indices of regional political and economic development suggest Russia‟s regions have developed 
widely divergent business environments. 
To capture part of this variation, we include Cm, a political competition index that relates to 
the perceived effectiveness of organizations that aggregate and transmit business community inter-
ests. Two features of the index make it useful for our analysis here. First, the rankings are based on 
electoral data and thus differ from indices that rely on opaque “expert” assessments.
 18 Second, the 
time period used to compile the index, 1995-2005, fits with our survey data collected in 2004. As 
we employ the index as an explanatory variable in regressions that explore the choice of firms and 
associations, our concerns about possible feedback effects from those behaviors to the regional po-
litical index are minimized (we know the index is based almost exclusively on electoral data that 
precedes the administration of our surveys). We also note that although Russia has now ended the 
practice of regional gubernatorial elections, they still took place during 1995-2005. 
Rm represents a vector of additional economic characteristics of the respondent‟s region: 
log per capita income; the sum of exports and imports as a share of gross regional product; the share 
of regional product contributed by the fuel and energy sector; and the share of industrial production 
in the region accounted for by the largest industrial sector.
19 
Model (1a) represents our baseline specification. In (1b), we add an interaction term, ECm 
(the product of Em and Cm). The thinking here is that the effect of more competitive politics may not 
                                                 
17 See Bradshaw and Vartapelov (2003) for various measures of regional inequality. 
18 The index of “political competition” we use comes from the Democratic Audit of Russia, a joint project of three inde-
pendent and respected Russian organizations − the Public Expertise Institute, the INDEM Foundation, and the Merkator 
Analytical Center. Individual regions were given scores from 1.0 to 5.0 (in increments of 0.5) based on their turnover in 
the executive branch, as well as the degree of political competition and diversity of representation in the legislature. 
Specifically, the project combined electoral data from 1995-2005 relating to the time in office of the sitting governor, 
the number of competitors in regional gubernatorial elections, the difference between the winner and the nearest com-
petitor, the share of United Russia (the “party of power”) in the regional parliament, the minimum percentage of votes 
threshold for a party to qualify for seats in the regional parliament, the participation rate in parliamentary elections 
(wherein proximity to 100% is taken to indicate coercion or fraud), and a measure of the difference between the percen-
tage of votes received by party candidates and the percentage of seats held by those parties in the legislature. The nature 
of the project, its rankings, and methodology were written up in Novaya Gazeta (Iakovenko, 2005), perhaps Russia‟s 
most respected independent newspaper. As a test of the index‟s validity, we used a survey question that asked firm 
managers “Which parties, if any, does your firm seek assistance from to influence the content of new laws and regula-
tions that will have an impact on your business?” The responses included legislators, the media, trade unions, executive 
branch personnel and influential individuals (e.g. business people). The first three institutions tend to be representative 
of broad social forces in democratic and more politically competitive regions. We found that firms in regions with a 
higher score on the index were more likely to report seeking assistance from these three, effects that were all significant 
at the 5% level.  Firms in these regions, however, were no more likely to rely on personnel in the executive branch or 
influential individuals. 
19 All economic data for the regions are annual measures for 2003 from Rosstat.  
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be uniform across firms of different sizes. A large firm may be less sensitive than a small firm to 
regional politics when choosing the best strategies for exercising influence. In (1c), we add lobby 
controls for membership in sector-specific and multi-sector associations to the baseline specifica-
tion. The interest here lies in exploring whether the marginal effect of membership in one type of 
association is more strongly related to using associations for lobbying purposes. If similar, the sub-
sequent investigation of their respective interests takes on greater meaning. If membership in one 
relates more clearly to use of associations for influencing state policy, then we would have much 
less reason to compare the interests of more- and less-encompassing lobbies. 
 
[Table 5] 
In the first three columns of Table 5, we present the results of probit models run on the three speci-
fications and inclusive of all responding firms. In columns four through six, we do the same but 
limit the analysis to firms that belong to a regional association.  
Among the most robust results observed in columns 1-3 is that firms in more politically 
competitive regions are more inclined to appeal to business lobby groups than those in less competi-
tive regions.
20 This relationship may be a direct function of the greater efficacy of business lobbies 
in more politically competitive environments or it could be (more indirectly) an artifact of higher 
membership rates in those more politically competitive regions. The continuing statistical signifi-
cance of the political competition index that we observe in columns 4 and 5 (in which analysis is 
restricted to regional association members) suggests that the result is driven at least in part by the 
former. Whatever the case, it seems clear that greater political competition complements lobby 
group influence. The results in columns 2 and 5 suggest, moreover, that the sensitivity of lobby 




                                                 
20 Perhaps unsurprisingly, our measure of political competition is strongly and positively correlated with using the me-
dia to influence new rules and regulations. 
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5  Lobby group composition and interests 
 
5.1  Assessing preferences for free markets 
 
To gauge associations‟ interests in government intervention, we draw on the answers to questions 
given by the managers of both firms and associations. They were asked two questions to elicit how 
favorably they were disposed to two types of policy measures: 
 
(1) To what degree do you agree with the statement that the government should create 
special conditions – through tax breaks, subsidies, etc. – so as to promote the devel-
opment of prioritized economic sectors? 
(2)  To what degree do you agree with the statement that regional governmental bodies 
should impose economic barriers to the import of goods from other regions and coun-
tries in order to support employment and an otherwise favorable economic environ-
ment in the region? 
 
The wording in these questions was deliberately phrased in a non-specific manner. References to 
individual sectors were omitted as to best capture general preferences toward types of targeted gov-
ernment interventions that would not be unfamiliar to respondents. Greater use of the tax code and 
regulatory mechanisms to benefit Russian manufacturing was the focus of a concerted lobbying ef-
fort by the federal TPP at roughly the same time as the survey was conducted (Gosudarstvennaia 
promyshlennaia politika, 2004). And throughout the 1990s, many regional governments manipu-
lated local laws and regulations to benefit narrow interests (Slinko et al., 2005; Guriev et al., 2009).  
Over the same time period, we have ample evidence of regional politicians promoting various pro-
tectionist measures in contradiction of federal laws designed to promote the free flow of goods 
across regional borders (Berkowitz and DeJong, 2003). 
Association managers were also asked how beneficial the seemingly imminent WTO ac-
cession for Russia would be both for their region and for the country as a whole.
i At the time, it was 
widely understood that accession would lower import tariffs, thus diminishing government interfer-
ence with trade flows and putting foreign and domestic companies on a more equal footing in sev-
eral previously-protected sectors (Chowdhury 2003). An intense public debate swirled around the 
issue. Some of the most protected sectors, such as automobiles, put up fierce opposition while oth-
ers, such as steel exporters, came out in strong support; RSPP was generally supportive although,  
BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/ 2010 
 
 
  19 
within its ranks, there was far from universal agreement (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). Most of the 
economic analysis pointed to positive net welfare effects with Rutherford and Tarr (2006) conclud-
ing that all regions would benefit with gains likely to be greatest in areas closest to international 
markets such as Russia‟s Far East and Northwest.
ii   
We believe these questions provide us with a comprehensive and direct test of Olson‟s hy-
pothesis by allowing us to test the robustness of our findings across two dimensions. First, we ask 
about targeted policy interventions in three separate ways. If Olson‟s hypothesis holds, groups more 
narrowly composed should be more favorably disposed toward regional trade barriers as well as 
targeted tax and/or regulatory policies. We would also expect them to be less favorably disposed to 
WTO accession.
iii  Second, the questions are asked to multiple types of actors: managers of lobby 
groups and managers of firms. Olson argues that the interests of the former should reflect their 
group‟s diversity. And his argument can be reasonably extended to suggest that group members re-
flect group interests as well. Support for Olson‟s hypothesis thus hinges on identifying robust corre-
lations between group composition and policy interests.
iv  
 
[Figure 1A, 1B, 1C] 
Figures 1A–1C lay out the distribution of responses to our questions. Managers of firms and re-
gional associations are more favorably disposed toward the scenario described in Question #1, what 
we might refer to loosely as industrial policy, than the policy described in Question #2 of imposing 
barriers to the inflow of goods from other regions and countries. For the industrial policy question, 
the modal response is 5, or highly favorable. There is a more even distribution of responses with 
respect to the import barriers question; for both types of respondents, the modal response is 1. With 
respect to WTO accession, the majority of association managers were relatively ambivalent in the 
sense that the response cluster in the range from 2 to 4. 
 
5.2  Explaining the interests of associations 
 
To assess the factors that explain variation in these responses, we estimate the following equation 
with ordered probit models on the sample of regional lobbies. Specifically, we asses the interests 
expressed by association managers at the m
th regional association with respect to the k
th policy 
(AImk). We do so by estimating the following ordered probit model: 
  AImk  = α + φ1Nm + φ2Bm + γAm + ζRm + εm .  (2) William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
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Here, we first seek to explain answers to the same pair of questions about industrial policy and re-
gional trade barriers that firms answered. Additionally, we consider the association manager‟s atti-
tude toward WTO accession and whether it will benefit their region and/or Russia. 
Our two measures of encompassingness are the number of sectors represented by the asso-
ciation, Ni, and a dummy variable capturing whether the lobby group was founded by another asso-
ciation. If, as Olson presumed, less-encompassing associations are more likely to favor government 
intervention to disrupt market forces, we would expect the coefficients on N and B, φ1 and φ2, to be 
negative when considering how favorably they regard industrial policy and trade barriers. Similarly, 
we would expect these proxies for encompassing interests to be positive when managers are asked 
about  how  favorably  they  regard  membership  in  WTO.We  also  control  for  other  association-
specific characteristics, Ai: number of full-time employees, years since founding, and both location 
and founder controls.  
Rm represents a vector of characteristics of the respondent‟s region: political competition, 
log per capita income; the sum of exports and imports as a share of gross regional product; the share 
of regional product contributed by the fuel and energy sector; and the share of industrial production 
in the region accounted for by the largest industrial sector.  
Table 7 lays out our results. The signs on our two proxies for encompassingness (number 
of sectors represented by the association‟s membership and founders include other business associa-
tions) are wholly consistent with Olson‟s theory. More-encompassing lobbies are less prone to sup-
port industrial policy and import barriers and more prone to have a favorable view of WTO acces-
sion. In several cases, these results are statistically significant. The relationships between the num-
ber of sectors represented and attitudes toward import barriers, the regional impact of WTO acces-
sion and the national impact are significant at the 5% level, as are the negative relationships be-
tween being founded by another association and support for industrial policy and import barriers. 
 
[Table 7] 
In terms of regional characteristics, we observe that associations from regions that engage in more 
trade are, as might be expected, more inclined to view WTO accession as beneficial to their region. 
We also observe that in regions dominated by a single industry, attitudes toward trade barriers are 
less positive. In general terms, however, the regional variables are relatively quiet and do not con-
sistently explain the variation in association managers‟ responses to these questions. 
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5.3  Explaining the interests of firms 
   
So as to provide further confirmation of the relationship between the interests and composition of 
lobby groups, we now turn to assessing the factors that explain variation in expressed policy prefer-
ences of managers at firms, again using straight-forward ordered probit models: 
  FIi,j  = α + β1Mi + β2Si + γFi + ζRi + εi   (3a) 
Here, we explore the relationship of the interests of firm i toward policy intervention j 
(FIi,j) to their membership in lobby groups of two specific types: multi-sectoral (Mi) and/or sector-
specific (Si). The coefficients β1 and β2 measure the extent to which membership in these types of 
association explains variation in these interests. If the more narrowly composed, sector-specific 
lobbies tend to value government intervention in markets, we would expect that β2 is positive, statis-
tically significant, and greater than β1. 
Fi is a vector of additional characteristics specific to the firm that one might reasonably 
presume affect interests toward government intervention. Controls for enterprise size, ownership by 
the state and by foreigners are included, as is one for whether the firm was created in the post-
Soviet era. Controls are included for a firm‟s exposure to trade beyond its regional borders. Specifi-
cally, dummies capture whether a firm purchases inputs from and sells outputs to foreign countries 
and other Russian regions. Other dummies measure whether the respondent has trade partners that 
include government entities or firms within a commercially-oriented business group (i.e. within a 
single, overlapping ownership structure). There are also indices measuring the relative sophistica-
tion of the firm‟s capital stock, the competitiveness of the firm‟s primary output market, and a 
dummy variable reflecting whether the firm‟s major competitors are based outside its region.  Loca-
tion controls are applied to capture whether the respondent is based in a regional capital , Moscow, 
or St. Petersburg.  
We also include enterprise sector controls. And finally, Ri represents a vector of the same 
regional characteristics that we controlled for in the models run on the responses of associations‟ 
managers. 
We now run a similar ordered probit model on the subset of regional lobby group mem-
bers: 
  FIi,j = α + βSi + γFi + ζRi + εi .  (3b) 
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Here, we only include a dummy variable for the i
th firm‟s membership in a sector-specific associa-
tion  (Si).  We  only  compare  sector-specific  association  members  with  members  of  more-
encompassing business organizations, not all other firms in the sample. 
The results for models (2a) and (2b) are laid out in Table 6. Considering the former, we 
observe in columns (1) and (2) that firms that are members of sector-specific associations are much 
more positively disposed toward policy interventions than firms that are not members of such asso-
ciations. β2 is positive and statistically significant with respect to both attitudes regarding industrial 
policy and trade barriers. Although β1 is also positive, it is statistically insignificant with respect to 
both questions. Firms that are members of multi-sector associations are no more likely than firms 
that are not members of such associations to embrace government intervention. 
 
[Table 6] 
When we restrict observation to only members in regional associations of either type, we 
observe from column 4 that members of sector-specific lobbies are more supportive than multi-
sector association members of regional trade barriers. This result is significant at the 5% level. Al-
though the coefficient on the sector-specific-association dummy is positive in column 3, it is not 
statistically significant. In other words, the relationship between membership in a sector-specific 
lobby and a favorable attitude toward industrial policy interventions, observed when considering the 
full sample, is not robust to restricting observation to the smaller sample of regional lobby mem-
bers. But in sum, the firm-level data provides fairly strong support for Olson‟s hypothesis. 
We also observe that smaller firms and firms established during the Soviet era are, all else 
equal, more positively disposed to government intervention. Regional characteristics, however, are 
conspicuously silent in explaining firms‟ interests in this regard. 
 
 
6  Relative importance of representation services 
 
As one additional step in our analysis, we return to the question of how important representation 
services are to lobby members by exploring whether that importance is a function of lobby type 
(multi-sector or sector-specific). Having earlier observed the percentages of firms that reported they 
had been approached a business association to lobby for the passage of new rules and regulations, 
we now turn to the more pointed question in the survey of firms where respondents were asked  
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questions specifically about the regional association that had been the most important to the finan-
cial well-being of their firm. 
Each enterprise manager was asked to rank on a scale from 1 (little value) to 5 (great 
value), the importance of ten separate services potentially offered by their association. If the asso-
ciation did not offer the firm a particular service, we recorded 0.
21 The average ranking of the ser-
vices listed in the menu was a bit different than the ranking in Table 3 given by regional associa-
tions when answering a similar question. Instead of reporting that the three representation services 
were the top three, firms rated information/consulting services and the facilitation of contacts with 
other Russian firms ahead of participating in the development of industrial policy and lobbying and 
participation in the development of legislation (which were ranked third, fourth, and fifth, respec-
tively).  
If  less-encompassing,  sector-specific  business  lobbies  are  more  favorably  disposed  to 
pushing for government intervention to subvert market flows of goods and services, we might feel 
more  comfortable  about  drawing  conclusions  as  to  their  welfare  effects  relative  to  more-
encompassing organizations. If we could also show that those same less-encompassing associations 
were more focused on representation services than other services whose welfare effects might be 
reasonably considered as positive (e.g. sponsoring trade fairs; running tribunals to mediate inter-
firm disputes), we would have at least some (admittedly indirect and imperfect) basis for  connect-
ing patterns of policy preferences to social welfare. To this end, we estimate the following equation 
to assess the relative importance of the services received by regional association members from 
their “most important” association: 
  RStv  = α + βSv + γFv + ζRv + εv .  (4) 
The relative importance of the t
th service to the v
th firm, RStv, is the ratio of the value (0-5) 
given by the firm to a particular service over the sum of the values given to all services. 
Sv is a dummy variable for the v
th firm‟s membership in a regional sector-specific associa-
tion. As we have restricted our analysis only to firms that see a regional lobby as their “most impor-
tant”  association,  the  coefficient  β  is  a  measure  of  the  difference  between  members  of  sector-
specific and members of multi-sector associations. Fv and Rv are vectors of the same firm and re-
gion-specific characteristics which we have controlled for in previous regressions. 
 
                                                 
21 With the exception that “helping develop small business,” which was not included, the services were the same as 
those listed in Table 3. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
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[Table 8] 
The first three columns of Table 8 present the results for each of the three business repre-
sentation services: lobbying, participating in the legislative process, and participating in the design 
of industrial policy. The numerator for the dependent variable used in the results presented in the 
fourth column is the sum of a respondent‟s values for all three of these representation services. 
We are most interested here in the coefficient on the dummy variable capturing whether 
the firm‟s “most important” regional association is sector-specific. Here, we observe that the signs 
on the each of the three representation services, as well as their aggregate (in column 4), is positive. 
In the cases of lobbying and the aggregated transmission of business interests to state officials, the 
result is statistically significant. In other words, members of narrower, less-encompassing associa-
tions are more likely to ascribe the value-added of association services to these representation ser-
vices. More-encompassing associations are more apt to focus on providing services that we might 
less readily associate with unproductive rent-seeking. 
 
7  Conclusions  
 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  economists  have  increasingly  turned  their  attention  to  institution-
focused stories concerning the fundamental determinants of economic performance and long-run 
growth. Olson‟s Rise and Decline of Nations (1982), a precursor to the current debate, argued that 
growth-retarding lobby groups can disrupt development in otherwise stable political environments. 
More recent work, much of it theoretical, has built on the notion that inefficient government inter-
ventions in an economy may constitute an equilibrium outcome in a world in which special interest 
groups bid for self-benefitting protection and support from self-interested public officials.  Never-
theless, economists have been oddly aloof to how and why lobby groups might vary in their social 
impact. In this article, we returned to Olson‟s original interest-group hypothesis, which we found 
was testable as to the relationship between lobby group composition and lobby group interests.  
Based on a unique pair of surveys on business associations and industrial enterprises across 
the Russian Federation, we show that less-encompassing business associations clearly regard tar-
geted government interventions more favorably. Somewhat surprisingly, our variables capturing the 
large regional variation in political and economic institutions across Russia do not help explain dif-
ferences in attitudes between more- and less-encompassing associations. As a confirmation of our 
main result, we showed that the members of the less-encompassing business associations are more  
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favorable to government intervention.  Further, we demonstrate that those same firms are most 
likely to place the greatest relative value on their association‟s lobbying and business representation 
services.  We believe we are the first to test directly and to confirm robustly Olson‟s view that 
lobby group composition and lobby group interests are related. More encompassing lobbies are 
more apt than their less encompassing cousins to prefer free markets.  
 William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
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Table 1  Summary statistics on firms  






sector association  
Members of sector-
specific association  
Basic characteristics       
  Full-time employees  390.6 (110)  867.4 (280)  801.1 (330) 
  First registered after 1991 (%)  44.1  43.4  29.2 
  State or municipal enterprise (%)  6.3  2.9  4.2 
  Influence of foreign shareholders (0-4 scale)  0.16 (0)  0.28 (0)  0.06 (0) 
  Level of technology (1-4 scale)  1.88 (2)  2.04 (2)  2.00 (2) 
  Located in Moscow (%)  4.1  2.9  4.2 
  Located in St Petersburg (%)  2.5  2.9  8.3 
  Located in capital city of territorial subject (%)  66.2  74.1  72.9 
       
Competition        
  Competition in output market (1-5 scale)  4.08 (4)  4.11 (5)  4.50 (5) 
  Major competitors include firms in other Rus-
sian regions (%) 
55.3  70.7  62.5 
  Major competitors include firms in other coun-
tries (%) 
22.9  40.0  35.4 
       
Trade partners       
  Sell to firms in other Russian regions (%)  53.7  74.6  62.5 
  Sell to firms in other countries (%)  24.0  45.4  33.3 
  Sell to Russian government (fulfill government 
orders) (%) 
22.6  24.4  29.2 
  Sell to firms in same commercial group (%)  12.5  13.2  12.5 
  Purchase inputs from firms in other Russian 
regions (%) 
59.7  72.7  62.5 
  Purchase inputs from firms in other countries 
(%) 
26.2  40.0  43.8 
  Purchase inputs from Russian government (%)  7.1  6.8  14.6 
  Purchase inputs from firms in same commercial 
group (%) 
11.2  12.2  10.4 
       
Sectors       
  Metallurgy  12.5  12.7  6.3 
  Machine building and metal working  14.7  23.4  10.4 
  Chemicals  15.0  11.7  6.3 
  Wood processing and paper  14.7  9.7  12.5 
  Building materials  15.3  10.7  20.8 
  Textiles  12.3  18.1  25.0 
  Food processing  15.5  13.6  18.8 
       
Number of observations  367  205  48 
       
Note: Median responses in parentheses. 
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Table 2  Summary statistics on regional associations 
   
  Multi-sector   Sector-specific  
Basic characteristics     
  Number of sectors represented (1-14  8.52 (9)  1 (1) 
  Full-time employees  19.30 (6)  2.47 (2) 
  Years since founding  9.01 (9)  6.67 (6) 
  Members exclusively in single city (%)  41.9  9.5 
  Located in Moscow (%)  4.0  0.0 
  Located in St. Petersburg (%)  4.0  9.5 
  Located in capital city of territorial subject (%)  59.7  85.7 
     
Founder(s)     
  Other business association(s) (%)  44.4  33.3 
  Individual(s), entrepreneur(s) (%)  50.0  57.1 
Government body at federal, regional and/or       
municipal level (%) 
22.6  23.8 
  Unions (%)  1.6  4.8 
  Individuals formerly in government (%)  6.5  4.8 
  Individuals formerly in Communist Party (%)  8.9  0.0 
     
Sectors     
  Metallurgy (%)  40.3  4.8 
  Chemicals (%)  50.0  9.5 
  Machine building and metal working (%)  70.2  4.8 
  Building materials (%)  68.5  0.0 
  Wood processing and paper  58.9  23.8 
  Light industry (%)  73.4  23.8 
  Food processing (%)  83.9  23.8 
  Transportation (%)  70.2  -- 
  Communications (%)  47.6  -- 
  Trade (%)  79.8  -- 
  Finance, credit and insurance (%)  66.1  -- 
  Healthcare (%)  44.4  -- 
  Education and science (%)  56.5  -- 
  Other (%)  42.5  09.5 
     
Number of observations  123  21 
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Table 3  How important are the following services to your 
 association at the present time? 
Lobbying government officials  4.50 
Participating in development of legislation  4.31 
Participation in development of industrial policy  4.23 
Helping develop small businesses  4.17 
Providing informational, legal, consulting services  4.07 
Protecting firms from illegitimate government inter-
ference 
3.99 
Helping firms develop contacts with other Russian 
firms 
3.94 
Helping develop a “social partnership” in social-
labor sphere 
3.63 
Helping develop behavioral standards/ethics  3.59 
Assisting in resolution of disputes between firms  3.59 
Helping firms develop contacts with foreign firms  3.09 
   
Number of observations  145 




Table 4  Does your firm try to influence the contents of new laws and regulations?              















that try to 
influence 
Assistance sought from:         
  business associations  10.9  20.9  30.3  39.7 
  personnel from executive 
branch  
20.1  32.2  56.0  61.1 
  personnel from legislative 
branch  
14.5  24.3  40.4  46.0 
  mass media  8.1  12.1  22.5  23.0 
  trade unions  4.8  7.9  13.3  15.1 
  influential individu-
als/entrepreneurs 
7.1  10.9  19.7  20.5 
         
Does not try to influence   64.0  47.3  --  -- 
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Table 5  Who appeals to business associations when trying to influence design of new laws and regulations? 
 
  All firms 
Members of regional asso-
ciation 
     
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Model  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit 
             
Member of multi-sector association      0.127***       
      (0.034)       
Member of sector-specific association      0.121*      0.050 
      (0.067)      (0.083) 
Full-time employees (log)  0.010  0.062***  -0.002  -0.006  0.140**  -0.008 
  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.029)  (0.070)  (0.028) 













  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
State or municipal enterprise  -0.014  -0.007  -0.003  -0.090  -0.077  -0.091 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.082)  (0.072)  (0.078) 
Influence of foreign shareholders  0.008  0.006  0.010  -0.009  -0.018  -0.008 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.030) 
Relative quality of capital equipment  0.005  0.006  0.000  -0.023  -0.019  -0.022 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.034) 
Degree of competition in output market  0.029***  0.029***  0.022***  0.072**  0.075**  0.068** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Political competition in region  0.035***  0.123***  0.024*  0.060*  0.324**  0.056 
  (0.013)  (0.041)  (0.013)  (0.036)  (0.154)  (0.036) 
Political competition x full-time em-
ployees   
-
0.016***      -0.043**   
    (0.006)      (0.021)   
GRP share of largest sector in region  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region  -0.059*  -0.061**  -0.047  -0.079  -0.096  -0.068 
  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.095) 
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in 
region  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Per capita income (log) in region  -0.063  -0.049  -0.072*  -0.053  -0.022  -0.056 
  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.103)  (0.099)  (0.101) 
             
Competitor and  trade partner controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Location controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Number of observations  583  583  583  235  235  235 
Adjusted R2  0.1721  0.1801  0.2462  0.1881  0.2046  0.1901 
             
Marginal effects from probit model are reported; robust standard errors,  adjusted for clustering at regional 
level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6  Intensity of enterprise managers’ interests with respect to government intervention: 
 promoting industrial policy and instituting regional trade barriers 
     
  All firms 
Members of regional asso-
ciations 










         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model  Ordered probit  Ordered probit  Ordered probit  Ordered probit 
         
Member of multi-sector association  0.136  0.125     
  (0.126)  (0.096)     
Member of sector-specific association  0.355**  0.400**  0.284  0.501** 
  (0.17)  (0.188)  (0.218)  (0.204) 
Full-time employees (log)  -0.095**  -0.028  -0.192**  -0.117* 
  (0.047)  (0.044)  (0.089)  (0.06) 
Founded in post-Soviet era  -0.224**  -0.042  -0.484***  -0.322* 
  (0.098)  (0.104)  (0.173)  (0.191) 
State or municipal enterprise  0.521**  0.045  0.706  -0.362 
  (0.227)  (0.209)  (0.549)  (0.328) 
Influence of foreign shareholders  -0.123  0.018  -0.296**  0.022 
  (0.084)  (0.098)  (0.119)  (0.137) 
Relative quality of capital equipment  0.061  -0.120**  0.254  0.046 
  (0.114)  (0.06)  (0.163)  (0.1) 
Degree of competition in output mar-
ket  0.023  0.026  -0.014  -0.03 
  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.08)  (0.086) 
Political competition in region  -0.047  -0.082  -0.131  -0.045 
  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.126)  (0.089) 
GRP share of largest sector in region  0.001  -0.012  0.005  -0.013 
  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region  -0.024  0.204  -0.054  -0.202 
  (0.17)  (0.154)  (0.269)  (0.302) 
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP 
in region  -0.006  -0.002  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Per capita income (log) in region  0.13  0.221  0.123  0.204 
  (0.202)  (0.278)  (0.423)  (0.532) 
         
Competitor and trade partner controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Location controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Number of observations  579  579  234  234 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Adjusted R2  0.0336  0.0263  0.0902  0.0615 
         
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 
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Table 7  Intensity of association managers’ interests with respect to government intervention: 
 promoting industrial policy, instituting regional trade barriers, promoting WTO accession 
     
 










           
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Model  Ordered probit  Ordered probit    Ordered probit  Ordered probit 
           
           
Number of sectors represented in  mem-
bership  -0.001  -0.070** 
 
0.083**  0.049** 
  (0.034)  (0.032)    (0.036)  (0.021) 
Founders include other business associa-
tion(s)  -0.794**  -0.534** 
 
0.327  0.291 
  (0.346)  (0.241)    (0.273)  (0.230) 
Full-time employees (log)  0.036  -0.006    0.196*  0.101 
  (0.099)  (0.098)    (0.104)  (0.066) 
Years since founding (log)  -0.061  0.135    -0.339  -0.072 
  (0.224)  (0.236)    (0.215)  (0.186) 
Membership from one city  0.201  0.222    0.420  0.045 
  (0.397)  (0.272)    (0.316)  (0.234) 
Political competition in region  0.112  0.103    -0.057  0.056 
  (0.150)  (0.127)    0.109  (0.121) 
GRP share of largest sector in region  0.009  -0.053***    -0.015  -0.005 
  (0.018)  (0.013)    (0.017)  (0.017) 
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region  -0.828  -0.237    1.580**  1.245 
  (1.011)  (0.473)    (0.709)  (0.987) 
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP in 
region  0.000  -0.002 
 
-0.002  0.002 
  (0.013)  (0.009)    (0.012)  (0.010) 
Per capita income (log) in region  0.527  1.041**    -0.397  -0.479 
  (0.690)  (0.486)    (0.663)  (0.565) 
           
Location controls  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Founder controls  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
           
Number  135  135    113  134 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000 
Adjusted R2  0.0874  0.0791    0.0935  0.0534 
           
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% 
levels, respectively. William Pyle and Laura Solanko  The composition and interests of Russia’s business 
lobbies: A test of Olson’s “encompassing organiza-
tion” hypothesis  
 
  36 
 
Table 8  Relative importance of business representation services to members of regional  
business associations 












ests to state 
officials  
         
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
         
Member of sector-specific associa-
tion  0.031**  0.005  0.003  0.038* 
  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Full-time employees (log)  0.009***  0.010***  0.002  0.022*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Founded in post-Soviet era  0.004  0.018***  0.008  0.030** 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
State or municipal enterprise  -0.037*  -0.013  -0.046  -0.096 
  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.039)  (0.068) 
Influence of foreign shareholders  0.003  0.000  -0.008*  -0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Relative quality of capital equipment  -0.007  -0.011*  -0.006  -0.025* 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
Degree of competition in output 
market  -0.004*  0.004  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Political competition in region  0.004  0.000  0.003  0.007 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
GRP share of  largest sector in re-
gion  -0.001**  -0.002**  0.000  -0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
(Exports+imports) / GRP in region  -0.005  0.000  0.002  -0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.042) 
(Fuel and energy production) / GRP 
in region  0.000  -0.001*  -0.001**  -0.002** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Per capita income (log) in region  0.034**  0.059***  0.019  0.112*** 
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.029) 
         
Competitor and trade partner con-
trols  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Location controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Number of observations  208  208  208  208 
R2  0.2176  0.2184  0.1597  0.2439 
         
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at regional level in parentheses. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 
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i Russia‟s WTO was one element of a series of structural reforms that President Putin was pushing for during his first 
term. Indeed, at the time of the surveys, most optimistic commentators expected membership to come as early as the 
end of 2004. 
ii Positive welfare effects are also found from micro-simulations based on extensive household-level data (Rutherford 
and Tarr, 2008). For additional World Bank research on the topic, see http://go.worldbank.org/CJQ7ZLJJF0.  
iii Since two of the three questions deal explicitly with barriers to trade, we should note that Olson highlighted that free 
trade was the most effective means for mitigating the malign effects of business lobby groups. We might thus presume 
that in questions of trade protection and market access, we would observe most clearly differences in the policy inter-
ests of more and less encompassing associations. Olson writes, “Because free trade and factor movement evade and 
undercut distributional coalitions … free trade undermines cartelization of firms, and indirectly also reduces monopoly 
power in the labor market. (142)” 
iv Our approach here mirrors that taken in the literature exploring the relationship between individual characteristics and 
preferences regarding government intervention in the flows of labor and goods across national borders (Mayda, 2006; 
Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O‟Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).   
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